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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of daily official foreign exchange interventions on the Czech 
koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (German mark prior to 1999) from 1997 to 2002. Using 
both the event study methodology and a variety of GARCH models reveal that central bank 
interventions, especially koruna purchases were fairly ineffective from 1997 to mid-1998 
compared to the size of the interventions. However, from mid-1998 to 2002, koruna sales were 
surprisingly effective in either smoothing the path of the exchange rate or even reversing the 
appreciating trend up to 60 days. Higher volatility triggered koruna purchases in the period from 
1997 to mid-1998, which in turn leads to higher volatility. This suggests that the CNB tried in 
vain to calm the markets after the currency crisis. Koruna sales simply yield more forex rate 
volatility, a by-product of the monetary authorities’ efforts to counter excessive appreciation. 
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1. Introduction 
Although it is widely acknowledged that unsterilised interventions may well have an influence 
on the exchange rate through changes in relative money supplies, for industrialised OECD 
economies, the empirical evidence is fairly mixed regarding the effectiveness of sterilised 
interventions, which may work through the portfolio, the signalling and the microstructure (or 
co-ordination) channels. For instance, Aguilar and Nydahl (2000) found limited effectiveness of 
official interventions for Sweden. Morana and Beltratti (2000) report similar results for the 
USD/DM exchange rate and Brandner et al. (2001), Brandner and Grech (2002) for the ERM 
currencies. Brissimis and Chionis (2004) suggest that interventions by the ECB were not 
effective for the yen/euro exchange rate. In contrast with these findings stand Fatum (2000), who 
finds evidence for effectiveness for the same currency pair. Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000), 
Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Brissimis and Chionis (2004) show that sterilised interventions 
were effective for the yen/USD and yen/euro exchange rates. Finally, Kim et al (2000), Edison et 
al. (2003) and Rogers and Siklos (2003) report mixed evidence for the case of Australia. None 
the less, Sarno and Taylor (2001) conclude in their literature survey that official interventions 
may succeed in influencing the exchange rate in the event that interventions are well 
communicated and are in line with the fundamentals. 
Canales-Kirjenko (2003) has recently argued that foreign exchange interventions may be more 
effective in developing and transition economies than in well-established industrialised countries 
because official interventions may work better in foreign exchange markets with low turnover, 
and because the market organisation and the regulatory framework may be more conducive to 
interventions, and moral suasion may also play a bigger role. Nevertheless, there is astonishingly 
little empirical research conducted to confirm the hypothesis of the effectiveness of central bank 
interventions in developing and emerging market economies
2 and no study has been so far 
published for transition economies using daily intervention data.
3 
In this paper, daily intervention data are used to study whether foreign exchange interventions 
were effective in the Czech Republic from 1997 to 2002. We first apply the event study approach 
and then employ a range of GARCH models to analyse the influence of official interventions on 
                                                           
2 Domac and Mendoza (2002) and Guiamaraes and Karacadog (2004) studied the cases of Turkey and Mexico. 
3 Holub (2004) analysed, in a narrative way, the case of the Czech Republic using monthly data.    2
the mean and the variance of the koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the German mark prior to 1999 
and the euro after 1999. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes briefly exchange rate and 
monetary policies and foreign exchange interventions in the Czech Republic. Section 3 presents 
the results of the event study approach. Section 4 contains the estimation results of the different 
GARCH specifications. Section 5 finally gives some concluding remarks. 
2. The Role of Foreign Exchange Interventions in the Czech 
Republic 
Similarly to other transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, monetary policy in 
Czechoslovakia and, after its split-up in 1993, in the Czech Republic was relying, at the early 
stages of the transition process, on the exchange rate as an intermediate target to achieve price 
stability. After four rounds of devaluation against the currency basket in 1990
4, the 
Czech(oslovakian) koruna’s central parity in the pegged system remained unchanged until the 
introduction of the managed float regime as a consequence of the currency crisis in 1997. As a 
result, average yearly inflation as high as 56.6% in 1991, chiefly as a consequence of price 
liberalisation, was brought down to 10% in 1994 and was stabilised in high one digit territory 
from 1995 to 1997. 
The Czech Republic complied with Article VIII of the IMF from October 1, 1995 on and joined 
the OECD in December 1995. This not only implied a very extensive liberalisation of the capital 
accounts, but also opened the door to massive capital inflows, the consequence of which was that 
the extremely tight fluctuation band of below ±1%
5 had to be widened to ±7.5% on 28 February 
1996. This was followed by the speculative attack against the Czech currency in May 1997, 
which, after massive interventions on the forex markets, pushed the Czech National Bank to 
                                                           
4 January 2, 1990: 2.1%; January 8, 1990: 16.3%; October 15, 1990: 55.2%; 28 December 1990: 15.9%. The 
currency basket was composed of 32.88% USD, 40.93 % DM, 12.32% ATS, 4.82% FRF and 9.05% CHF until 
December 27, 1990. From December 28, 1990, weights in the basket were adjusted and the French franc was 
replaced by the British pound: 31.34% USD, 45.52% DM, 12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP and 6.55% CHF. On January 
2, 1992, weights were re-adjusted and the French franc regained its previous position by crowding out the British 
pound: 9.7% USD, 36.15% DM, 8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF and 3.79% CHF. Shortly after the introduction of the 
Czech koruna, the basket was simplified to two currencies in May 3, 1993: 35% USD and 65% DM. 
5 ±0% till August 1992, ±0.5% from September 27, 1992 to April 24  1995, ±0.75% from April 25 1995 until 
February 27 (this widening was due to the fact that the CNB charged an additional 25 p.p. as a fee for trades on the 
market), 1996 and ±7.5% from February 28, 1996 to May 26, 1997.   3
abandon the peg and to introduce managed float on 27 May 1997. The new regime was oriented 
against the German mark and after 1998, against the euro (CNB, 1997, p. 25). 
Figure 1. Exchange Rate Regime in the Czech Republic, 1993-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      Note: Exchange rate developments are depicted relative to the official central parity prevailing in the 
pegged regime. The series refers to the koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the basket under the peg, and 
against the German mark and the euro in the managed float.  
As the exchange rate could not serve anymore as an intermediate target, and because money 
demand was too unstable to serve as an anchor, the Czech National Bank introduced, first among 
the transition economies, a direct inflation targeting framework from the beginning of 1998.
6 
In the framework of the inflation targeting policy, the Czech National Bank (CNB) preserves the 
right to intervene on the foreign exchange market if there are “major deviations of the exchange 
rate that are not connected with domestic economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy 
(CNB, 1998, p. 46). A strong motivation for the CNB to avoid strong currency misalignments is 
the high openness of the Czech economy in terms of exports and imports.
7  
As shown on Figure 1, the koruna was on a steady appreciating path from 1998 till the end of 
2002, brought about by the massive privatisation of the corporate sector and greenfield 
investments, which resulted in an inflow of around USD 30 billion
8 if FDI between 1998 and 
2002. During this period, the CNB intervened on the foreign exchange markets in an attempt to 
smooth or event to reverse the appreciation of the koruna vis-à-vis the German mark and the 
                                                           
6 For a very comprehensive treatment of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic, see Coats (2000). 
7 The ration ((X+M)/2)/GDP was around 50% in 1997 and increase to about 60% by 2000 and to approximately 
56% at the end of 2002. 
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euro.
9 From 2000 to 2002, off-market operations concerted between the CNB, the Ministry of 
Finance and the National Property Fund were also undertaken to neutralise the effects of 
privatisation revenues on the exchange rate (CNB, 2001, 2002). 
Figure 2 and Table 1 provide an overview of the CNB’s intervention activity on the foreign 
exchange markets, according to which the Czech central bank both sold and purchases the 
domestic currency in the aftermath of the currency crisis in 1997. Although it also purchased 
koruna in 1998 on a few occasions, from 1998 to late 2002, the Czech monetary authorities’ 
interventions took the shape of koruna sales to smooth the appreciation or even to try to weaken 
of the Czech currency. Figure 3 also indicate that especially in 1997 and 1998, central bank 
interventions are associated with increased exchange rate volatility. Although our daily 
intervention series ends in 2002, it should be noted that the CNB did not intervene in 2003, but 
was buying the koruna from April 2004 onwards. These foreign currency sales can be viewed not 
that much as efforts to avoid excessive depreciation but rather as sales of foreign reserves 
motivated by the elimination of losses of the CNB (by appreciating the CZK). 
Figure 2. Interventions in the Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Czech National Bank 
 
                                                           
9 CNB (1998, p 33.): “The CNB intervened on the foreign exchange market to moderate the appreciation pressures 
generated by the foreign capital inflow.” 
CNB (1999, p 45.): “the koruna’s exchange rate was affected by the CNB’s interventions to prevent an excessive 
koruna appreciation.” 
CNB (2000, p. 48): “The koruna’s nominal exchange rate against the euro exhibited an overall appreciation 
tendency in 2000. This gradual strengthening was interrupted at end-Q1 by the CNB’s foreign exchange 
interventions to prevent excessive appreciation of the koruna…” 
CNB (2002, p. 36): “The koruna continued to appreciate (…). As a result, at its extraordinary meeting on 21 January 
2002 the Bank Board (…) also approved intervention in the foreign exchange market.” 
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Note: Interventions are in billions of Czech koruna. Negative (positive) values show koruna purchases (sales).The exchange rate is shown as the 
deviation from the period average koruna/euro (German mark) exchange rate.   5
 
Figure 3. Interventions and unconditional exchange rate volatility in the Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Interventions are shown in absolute value. Volatility is measured as the mirror image of squared changes in 
the exchange rate 2 ) e (∆ in the figure on the left-hand side. In the figure on the right hand side, volatility is computed 
as standard deviation for a backward looking 30-day window. 
 
Table 1. Summary of interventions activities of the Czech National Bank, 1997:06-2002 
(CZK billions) 
   Mean Median Min Max  SD  Days of intervention 
1997 Total  2.88  2.42  0.18 8.69  2.03 40 
 Sales  2.81  2.52  0.18 8.59  1.82 27 
 Purchases  3.03  2.13  0.95 8.69  2.49 13 
1998 Total  1.94  1.46  0.19 10.75 2.26 37 
 Sales  1.95  1.46  0.19 10.75 2.38 33 
 Purchases  1.84  1.83  0.99 2.72  0.99 4 
1999 Total  4.10  0.81  0.22 18.76 7.16 10 
 Sales  4.10  0.81  0.22 18.76 7.16 10 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0 
2000 Total  4.45  1.27  0.36 11.49 5.24 5 
 Sales  4.45  1.27  0.36 11.49 5.24 5 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0 
2001 Total  5.64  2.52  2.33 12.08 5.57 3 
 Sales  5.64  2.52  2.33 12.08 5.57 3 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0 
2002 Total  1.91  0.91  0.10 12.06 2.84 37 
 Sales  1.91  0.91  0.10 12.06 2.84 37 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0 
1997-2002 Total  2.56  1.43  0.10 18.76 3.24 132 
 Sales  2.53  1.42  0.10 18.76 3.37 115 
 Purchases  2.75  2.13  0.95 8.69  2.26 17 
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3. The Event Study Approach 
3.1. Methodological Considerations 
A big advantage of the event study approach over time series techniques is that it only looks at 
periods when interventions take place, and is thus able to filter out longer periods during which 
no interventions happen and which may cause econometric studies to find no relation between 
foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate behaviour (Fatum, 2000; Fatum and 
Hutchinson, 2003). 
When applying the event study approach, three issues have to be tackled:  
(a) how single interventions in one direction can form a single intervention episode or event: 
the question is of how many days may separate two single intervention acts going in the same 
direction (both purchases or both sales) can be considered as two distinct intervention events. 
Five alternative definitions of the intervention event are considered in this study. We consider 
intervention events, which comprise single interventions in one direction between which up to 2, 
5, 10, 20 and 30 consecutive days can pass without intervention activity. The intervention event 
ends if more than 2, 5, 10, 20 or 30 days go by without intervention or if an intervention in the 
other direction takes place.
10 
(b) under what circumstances an intervention episode can be viewed as effective/successful: 
Three classes of effective interventions can be distinguished. 
Leaning against the wind (WIND): central bank interventions reverse the trend of the exchange 
rate, i.e. the exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) in the pre-event window, and following the 
purchases (sales) of domestic currency, it appreciates (depreciates) in the post-event window.  
Smoothing exchange rate movements (SMOOTH): central bank interventions slow down the 
appreciation or the depreciation of the domestic currency, i.e. buying (selling) the domestic 
currency causes the exchange rate to depreciate less (appreciate more) in the post-event window 
than in the pre-event window. 
                                                           
10 Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use up to 15 days and Edison et al. (2003) use up to 10 days with 
no intervention between two neighbouring interventions within an event.   7
Leaning with the wind (WITH): purchases (sales) of the domestic currency should cause the 
exchange rate to appreciate more (depreciate more) after the intervention episode than before the 
intervention episode. 
(c) how long a time horizon should be analysed before and after the intervention event 
(definition of pre- and post-event windows) 
As to the size of the pre- and post-event windows, we look at six different lengths: 2, 5, 10, 20, 
30, 40 and 60. The pre- and post-event windows are constructed in a symmetric way implying 
that a 2-day (5-day etc.) pre-event window is compared to a 2-day (5-day etc.) post-event 
window.
11 In addition, effectiveness is also analysed for the event window itself. The pre-event 
window is set to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 days if the event window size is equal or lower than 2 days 
(higher than 2 (5, 10, 20 and 30) but equal or lower than 5 (10, 20 and 30)). 
Finally, not only changes in the exchange rate but also changes in the volatility of the exchange 
rate can be analysed. For this purpose, volatility measured as standard deviation over the 
(symmetric) pre- and post-event windows are compared. 
3.2. Data and Results 
The source of daily foreign exchange intervention data is the Czech National Bank. The sample 
period spans from January 1997 to August 2002. The interventions are expressed in terms of 
domestic currency because the sample period comprises the switch from the German mark to the 
euro. Expressing interventions in the same currency units ensures full comparability. Note also 
that the Czech National Bank intervened in US dollar once in July 1997. As stated in CNB 
(1997), the managed float was, however, oriented to the German mark. In accordance with 
common practice in the literature, purchases (sales) of the foreign currency are positive 
(negative) values. Thus, purchases (sales) of the domestic currencies are denoted with negative 
(positive) figures. The exchange rate series against the German mark and the euro are provided 
by the Czech National Bank. Only data for trading days are considered for the study implying the 
exclusion of week-ends and public holidays. 
                                                           
11 Fatum (2000) employs 2, 5, 10, and 15-day window sizes, whilst Edison et al. (2003) looks at 2-day and 21-day 
windows. Edison and others term the 2-day window the short-term and the 21-day window the long-term.   8
As shown in Table 2, the number of intervention episodes in the Czech Republic varies between 
29 (maximum 2 days of no intervention) and 18 (maximum 30 days of no intervention). The 
number of intervention episodes appears to be fairly robust to the use of the 10-day, 20-day and 
30-day filters as the number of identified episodes are 21, 19 and 18, respectively.  
Table 2. The number of the identified intervention episodes 
Maximum days of intervention inactivity between two 
consecutive interventions 
1997:06 to 2002:09 
2 days  5 days  10 days   20 days   30 days 
29 23  21  19  18 
 
Table 3 reports results regarding the relationship between the exchange rate and exchange rate 
volatility on the one hand, and on the 18 intervention episodes established on the basis of the 30-
day no-intervention, on the other hand. In yellow are marked the pre- and post event windows 
without any overlap with previous or forthcoming intervention episodes. Note that detailed 
results for different event sizes are not reported hereafter
12. However, summary statistics for 
events established using intervention inactivity between two consecutive interventions of 2, 5, 10 
and 30 days are given in Tables 4 and 5.  
As can be seen in Table 3, it is very difficult to assess the effectiveness of the intervention events 
in 1997 and early 1998, because of the overlaps between individual events. This seems to be no 
problem for the second half of the period. There are only four events consisting in koruna 
purchases, of which two (No. 5 and No. 9) are found to be completely ineffective, one (No. 7) 
cannot be evaluated at all because of overlaps, whilst the remaining one (No. 2) appears to be a 
leaning against the wind, i.e. reversing depreciation over a very short time period (2 days). 
Koruna sales during the same period are a little more effective, but only at very short time 
horizons. It should be mentioned, though, that there are a number of overlapping pre- and post-
window sizes, for which some of the intervention events qualify as either leaning against the 
wind or exchange rate smoothing. The difficulty of interpreting these results is, however, not 
only that they are in an overlapping window, but also because overlaps occur between domestic 
currency sales and purchases. 
The second part of the period under study from mid-1998 to end-2002 covers only intervention 
episodes, which were all koruna sales. Not only that overlapping windows are less of a problem, 
                                                           
12 These results are available from the authors upon request.   9
but these intervention events are strikingly effective in either smoothing or reverting the 
appreciation of the koruna. For pre- and post-event windows higher than 2 days, out of the forty 
three assessable windows, only two are found to be unsuccessful and for the rest success always 
imply either exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind strategies. 
Table 4 documents that these results are not particularly sensitive to how the intervention events 
are defined (number of no intervention activity between two single intervention act). A general 
observation is that as the pre- and post event window size increases, the number of assessable 
periods drops significantly. However, when assessable, the share of successes amount to around 
80% for pre- and post-event windows of 2, 5, 10 or 20 days and to a very impressive 100% for 
pre- and post-event windows of 30, 40 and 60 days. At the same time, for pre- and post-event 
windows higher than 2 days, successful periods are either exchange rate smoothing or leaning 
against the wind. The share of leaning against the wind episodes dominates exchange rate 
smoothing for short pre- and post-event window, the domination transforms into exchange rate 
smoothing. This indicates that it is easier to reverse the trend of the exchange rate in the short run 
than at 30-day or longer horizons. 
Regarding unconditional exchange rate volatility measured by means of standard deviation, 
interventions are associated with both increases and decreases in volatility (Table 3). There are 
episodes for which whether or not volatility increases or decreases hinges largely upon the size 
of the pre- and post-event window. For a number of episodes especially in 1998 and 1999, 
interventions systematically cause exchange rate volatility to increase, while in 2001 and 2002, 
they tend to dampen forex volatility. Table 5 summarises these results in a more systematic way, 
and suggests that for short pre- and post-event windows, the share of intervention episodes for 
which forex volatility increased equals the one of episodes followed by lower forex volatility. 
However, in the longer term up to 60 days, foreign exchange interventions tend to be associated 
with a rise rather than with a drop in foreign exchange volatility. 
   10
Table 3. The effectiveness of intervention episodes based on maximum 30 days of no intervention 
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW  No. YEAR    Initial 
intervention 
Total 
intervention 
Days of 
Interventions 
Total 
days 
Next episode 
(days away) 
Type of 
Intervention 
2 5  10  20  30  40  60 
Exchange rate returns 
1 1997   -4.082  -39.010  13  16  3  SALE  WITH WIND  WIND         
2 1997   0.954  4.492  4  6  2  PURCHASE  WIND WIND WIND WIND WITH WIND WIND 
3 1997   -4.792  -27.843  10  14  36  SALE  SMOOTH  WIND   WITH WITH WIND  
4 1997   -2.046  -2.046  1  1  16  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND WITH WITH 
5 1997   2.134  34.871  9  26  10  PURCHASE        WIND   WIND WIND 
6 1997   -1.161  -7.042  3  3  8  SALE  SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND         
7  1998    0.989  4.652  3  5  1  PURCHASE  WIND WIND WIND WITH WIND WIND WIND 
8  1998    -0.196  -51.453  30  56 36  SALE WIND WITH WITH WITH      
9 1998   2.721  2.721  1  1  24  PURCHASE          WITH   
10 1998   -0.813  -12.986  3  9  311  SALE  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND    WIND 
11 1999   -18.757  -35.257  2  4  49  SALE  WITH  WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH SMOOTH 
12 1999   -0.899  -6.097  9  11  62  SALE  WITH  WIND  SMOOTH    SMOOTH  SMOOTH  
13 2000   -11.491  -13.228  3  4  164  SALE  WIND    WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH 
14 2000   -8.651  -8.651  1  1  225  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND 
15 2001   12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH    
16 2001   2.332  13.064  5  25  45  SALE  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH 
17 2002   11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE    SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND  WIND SMOOTH 
18 2002   1.169  28.696  28  53  50  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND 
Exchange rate volatility 
1 1997   -4.082  -39.010  13  16  3  PURCHASE  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
2 1997   0.954  4.492  4  6  2  SALE  LOW LOW HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW 
3 1997   -4.792  -27.843  10  14  36  PURCHASE  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
4 1997   -2.046  -2.046  1  1  16  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
5 1997   2.134  34.871  9  26  10  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
6 1997   -1.161  -7.042  3  3  8  PURCHASE  LOW  LOW LOW LOW HIGH  LOW LOW 
7  1998    0.989  4.652  3  5  1  SALE  LOW HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
8  1998    -0.196  -51.453  30 56 36 PURCHASE  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW  HIGH HIGH 
9 1998   2.721  2.721  1  1  24  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
10 1998   -0.813  -12.986  3  9  311  PURCHASE  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
11 1999   -18.757  -35.257  2  4  49  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
12 1999   -0.899  -6.097  9  11  62  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW 
13 2000   -11.491  -13.228  3  4  164  PURCHASE  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
14 2000   -8.651  -8.651  1  1  225  PURCHASE  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH 
15 2001   12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
16 2001   2.332  13.064  5  25  45  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW LOW 
17 2002   11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
18 2002   1.169  28.696  28  53  50  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW 
Note: SMOOTH = exchange rate smoothing, WIND= leaning against the wind, WITH = leaning with the wind, HIGH (LOW) indicate that the unconditional volatility in the post-event window is higher (lower) than in the 
pre-event window. 
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Table 4. Non-overlapping episodes, and the share of successful episodes 
EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
  2 5 10  20  30 40 60 
2 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  93% 55% 38% 24% 21% 17% 7% 
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  67% 75% 91% 71% 100% 100% 100% 
          AGAINST (% of assessable)  72% 67% 80% 80% 50% 40% 50% 
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  6% 33% 40% 20% 50% 60% 50% 
          WITH (% of assessable)  22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
5 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  77% 77% 68% 36% 27% 23% 9% 
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  76% 82% 80% 75% 100% 100% 100% 
          AGAINST (% of assessable)  69% 71% 67% 67% 50% 40% 50% 
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  8% 29% 33% 33% 50% 60% 50% 
          WITH (% of assessable)  23% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  90% 76% 71% 38% 29% 24% 10% 
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  79% 81% 80% 75% 100% 100% 100% 
          AGAINST (% of assessable)  60% 69% 67% 67% 50% 40% 50% 
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  13% 31% 33% 33% 50% 60% 50% 
          WITH (% of assessable)  27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  89% 72% 61% 56% 44% 33% 11% 
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  75% 77% 91% 80% 100% 100% 100% 
          AGAINST (% of assessable)  58% 70% 60% 63% 50% 50% 50% 
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  17% 30% 40% 38% 50% 50% 50% 
          WITH (% of assessable)  25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Table 5. Intervention episodes and unconditional exchange rate volatility 
EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
  2 5 10  20  30 40 60 
2 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  93% 55% 38% 24% 21% 17% 7% 
            LOW (% of  assessable)  56% 44% 27% 0% 17% 20% 0% 
            HIGH (% of  assessable)  44% 56% 73% 100% 83% 80% 100% 
5 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  77% 77% 68% 36% 27% 23% 9% 
            LOW (% of  assessable)  41% 47% 33% 13% 17% 20% 0% 
            HIGH (% of  assessable)  59% 53% 67% 88% 83% 80% 100% 
10 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  90% 76% 71% 38% 29% 24% 10% 
            LOW (% of  assessable)  53% 50% 33% 13% 17% 20% 0% 
            HIGH (% of  assessable)  47% 50% 67% 88% 83% 80% 100% 
30 DAYS    
TOTAL EPISODES  18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  89% 72% 61% 56% 44% 33% 11% 
            LOW (% of  assessable)  50% 46% 36% 30% 38% 33% 0% 
            HIGH (% of  assessable)  50% 54% 64% 70% 63% 67% 100%   12
4. Econometric Investigation 
4.1. Interventions, Exchange Rates and Volatility 
The effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions is investigated using a GARCH framework, 
which is admittedly well suited for such an investigation because they analyse simultaneously 
the mean and the conditional variance of the exchange rate series. Dominguez (1998) used a 
mean equation specification, in which the log-difference of the exchange rate returns ( t e ∆ ) are 
regressed on the intervention series ( t I ), the interest differential ( t i ∆ ) between overnight money 
market rates in the home economy and the foreign benchmark (Germany and the euro area)
13, 
and dummy variables capturing day of the week effects. The conditional variance equation 
includes the absolute value of interventions, the interest differential and day-of-the-week 
dummies. We extend this approach by distinguishing not only between domestic currency sales 
and purchases but also between small and large interventions and one-day and longer 
intervention episodes. Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of 
the interventions (in the same direction) over the whole period, and small interventions are those 
below the average. 
t i
i
i t
small S
t
e arg l S
t
small P
t
e arg l P
t t D i I I I I e ε φ φ φ φ φ φ φ + ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ∆ ∑
=
+
− − − −
4
1
3 3 24 23 22 21 1  (1) 
) , ( N ~ t t
2
1 0 σ ε − Ω            ( 2 )  
2
1
2
1 3 24 23 22 21 1
2
− −
− − − − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = t t i t
small S
t
e arg l S
t
small P
t
e arg l P
t t D i I I I I σ β ε α ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ σ
            ( 3 )  
where  t I  takes negative (positive) values for purchases (sales) of the domestic currency. 
3 2 1 D , D , D and  4 D are dummy variables that take the value of 1 on Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday, respectively. 
2
1 − t ε  and 
2
1 − t σ  are the ARCH and GARCH terms. Ísberg 
and Pétursson (2003) suggest the use of a dummy variable, which captures long intervention 
episodes. The dummy takes the value of 1 if a given intervention act is preceded by intervention 
activity in (t-1) and (t-2). In addition to the Ísberg and Pétursson dummy, we also use a more 
                                                           
13 Overnight money market rates are drawn from Bloomberg for the Czech economy, and from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank for Germany and the euro area.   13
loosely defined dummy, which is 1 if any given intervention is preceded by intervention during 
one of the preceding five days, and is 0 otherwise. To correct for the endogeneity bias, which 
arises in the context of exchange rate returns and interventions, equations (1) and (3) are re-
specified with one- and two-day lagged interventions, respectively. The equations presented thus 
far rest on a GARCH(1,1) model. In order to check for robustness to model specification and to 
look at possible asymmetries in the conditional variance equation, a number of alternative 
GARCH models are also used for the econometric investigation, and these are (a) the GARCH in 
mean (GARCH-M), (b) the exponential GARCH (EGARCH), (c) the threshold GARCH 
(TGARCH) and (d) the component GARCH (CGARCH). 
4.2 The Causal Direction between Interventions and Forex 
Volatility 
Although the GARCH framework provides help in identifying any relationship between official 
interventions on the one hand, and between changes in and the volatility of the exchange rate, on 
the other hand, it does not indicate the direction of causality, i.e. whether past exchange volatility 
initiates interventions or past interventions leads to higher volatility or whether interventions are 
exogenous. An interesting question to address is the causal relation between interventions and 
exchange rate volatility. Central banks may intervene in order to lower volatility on disorderly 
exchange markets. This may be especially the case during periods of market turmoil. However, 
during periods of relative calm, central banks may want to intervene to increase exchange rate 
volatility. This is because higher market uncertainty may discourage market participants to take 
large open positions (Edison et al., 2003). 
When investigating the relationship between interventions and forex volatility, one may use 
either volatility measures based on the implied volatility of option prices (Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996), Dauchy (2001), Beine et al. (2002) for the three big currency pairs and Rogers 
and Siklos (2003) for Canada and Australia) or volatility derived using econometric techniques, 
such as the GARCH framework (Dominguez, 1998, Edison et al, 2003, and Guimaraes and 
Karacadag, 2004). We follow the second avenue mainly because of the lack of data on currency 
options in the countries under study, and the conditional volatility obtained from the different 
GARCH models is employed.    14
The issue of causality between interventions and exchange rate volatility can be addressed using 
pair-wise Granger causality tests. According to the concept of Granger causality, not only lagged 
values of koruna sales and purchases (volatility) but also past values of volatility,VOL, 
(interventions) can impact on interventions (volatility) as shown below: 
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where  k  is the lag length. Conventional F-tests can be carried out to verify if the joint null 
hypothesis of  0 2 1 0 = = = = k ... : H θ θ θ can be rejected, i.e. whether or not lagged values of 
volatility (interventions) are significant in statistical terms. If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
volatility (intervention) is said to Granger-cause interventions (volatility).  
Given that both the intervention and the volatility series are found to be difference stationary in 
levels, the Granger causality tests are carried out for variables in levels. 
4.3 Estimation Results 
The estimations are carried out using interventions without lag, and with one-, two- and three-
day lags for the entire period (1997:06-2002:12) and for two sub-periods. The first sub-period 
covers the aftermath of the currency crisis and runs from 1997:06 to 1998:05. The second sub-
period from 1998:06 to 2002:12 is the period when only koruna sales took place in order to slow 
down or counteract the nominal appreciation. The results are reported in Tables 6a to 6c. 
For the whole period, the estimation results indicate that only small koruna purchases
14 are 
correlated significantly with the exchange rate when using interventions without lag. However, 
the relationship is negative, and this implies that koruna purchases are linked to currency 
                                                           
14 Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of the interventions over the whole 
period, and small interventions are those below the average. For purchases (sales), average purchases (sales) are 
used. Thus, what is large is defined as compared to the average of the interventions in the same direction.   15
depreciation rather than a nominal appreciation as we would have expected
15. For interventions 
with a two-day lag, in addition to small koruna purchases, large koruna purchases also turn out to 
have a robust negative relationship with the exchange rate. At the same time, 
long P D
−  is 
significant with a negative sign, meaning that long periods of koruna go hand in hand with an 
appreciation of the exchange rate. Looking at the results obtained for the sub-period 1997 to 
1998, the results change slightly. Only small koruna purchases without lag and large koruna 
purchases with a two-day lag have a statistically significant and negative relationship with the 
exchange rate. The dummy 
long P D
−  becomes mostly insignificant, regardless whether using lags 
or not. 
Coming now to koruna sales, only large koruna sales enter the estimated equations significantly 
and with a positive sign, and this for the lagged specification. Hence, koruna sales seem to have 
the expected effect on the exchange rate by leading to a depreciation. For the first sub-period, 
they do not appear to matter for the exchange rate for any of the specifications. Let us now turn 
to the second sub-period, which contains only koruna sales. The results reported in Table 6c 
provide strong for that small koruna sales go indeed in tandem with a currency depreciation. 
However, this holds true only without lags. For lagged interventions, only large koruna sales are 
found to be statistically significant and signed positively. The length of the intervention (
long S D
− ) 
does not seem to play a role. Finally, it deserves mention that the results for interventions with 
one day are not reported here because the former is very similar to results obtained without.  
Let us now analyse the relationship between interventions and exchange rate volatility. 
According to the conditional variance equations reported in Tables 6a-6c, large and small koruna 
purchases tend to be associated with an increase in forex volatility. The dummy 
long P D
−  is 
negative if it is found to be significant, indicating that prolonged periods of koruna purchases 
may be linked to a fall in forex volatility. For koruna sales, longer periods of interventions are 
related to higher forex volatility (Table 6b). The same applies to large koruna sales (Table 6c). 
However, it is fair to say that these relationships are not particularly robust to different types of 
GARCH models and to the use of lags.  
                                                           
15 Koruna purchases (sales) are denoted by negative (positive) figures. As the exchange rate is defined in foreign 
currency terms (a decrease (increase) indicates an appreciation (depreciation)), a positive relationship between 
koruna purchases (sales) and the exchange rate indicates that purchases (sales) cause the exchange rate to 
appreciation (depreciation). A negative relationship implies that purchases (sales) lead to a currency depreciation 
(appreciation).   16
Notwithstanding the slim evidence in favour of a robust relationship positive between 
interventions and exchange rate volatility, i.e. forex exchange interventions are linked to an 
increase in forex volatility, pair-wise Granger causality tests are carried out for koruna sales and 
purchases in order to determine the direction of causality. As shown in Table 4, exchange rate 
volatility triggers koruna purchases at lag length higher than 10. At the same time, for lags below 
10, an opposite causation runs from koruna purchases to forex volatility. The same causal 
relationship can be established for koruna sales. Hence, increased forex volatility causes the 
central bank to purchase koruna, which in turn leads to a rise in forex volatility. For koruna sales, 
foreign exchange interventions simply lead to higher forex volatility. 
Table 6a. Estimation Results, 1997 to 2002 
 
t I   2 − t I  
 GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH
MEAN EQUATION 
e arg l P I −   -0.0006* -0.0006*  -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008***  -0.0018*** -0.0021*** -0.0021***  -0.0018*** -0.0018*** 
small P I
−   -0.0029** -0.0028***  -0.0027** -0.0023***  -0.0022*** -0.0028  -0.0038**  -0.0038** -0.0028  -0.0017 
e arg l S I −   0.0000 0.0000  0.0002 0.0001  0.0001  0.0005** 0.0006***  0.0009*** 0.0006**  0.0004* 
small S I −   0.0005 0.0005  0.0007  0.0004  0.0001 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003  0.0009  0.0004 
long P D −   -0.0022 -0.0024*  -0.0009  -0.0010 -0.0019*  -0.0044*  -0.0063*** -0.0069***  -0.0044*  -0.0026 
long S D −   -0.0011 -0.0010  -0.0013*  -0.0016**  -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0002  -0.0011  0.0001 
i ∆   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
e arg l P I −   -1.2E-05*** -1.2E-05** -0.2613***  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0515  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
small P I −   -3.1E-05*** -3.2E-05*** -0.7280***  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.2636  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
e arg l S I −   0.0000 0.0000  0.1171**  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 2.4E-06* 0.0532  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
small S I −   0.0000 0.0000  0.1224  -3.3E-06*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 -4.2E-06*** -0.0775 0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
long P D −   -5.5E-05*** -5.7E-05*** -1.1512**  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.4144  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
long S D −   0.0000 0.0000  -0.1621  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0232  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
i ∆   1.6E-07** 1.6E-07** 0.0055  -2.2E-07*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 3.1E-07***  0.0059* 0.0000  1.5E-06*** 
-1.1E-06***
Notes:  t I  and  2 − t I refer to the contemporaneous or the delayed use of interventions.  I  is the aggregate intervention,  I is the absolute value of 
aggregate intervention,  i ∆  is the interest differential,  e arg l I small I  stand for large and small interventions,  purchase I  and  sales I  denote 
domestic currency purchases and sales, 
e arg l P I − small P I
− e arg l S I −  and 
small S I
−  refer to large and small domestic currency purchases (P) and 
sales (S), respectively.  long P D −  and  long S D −  are dummy variables capturing prolonged intervention periods of domestic currency purchases (P) 
and sales (S). For the variance equation, two figures are reported for CGARCH. The upper one refers to the long-term variance equations, and the 
one situated below is obtained from the short-term variance equation. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.   17
Table 6b. Estimation Results, 1997 to 1998 
 
t I   2 − t I  
 GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH
MEAN EQUATION 
e arg l P I −   -0.0006 -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0008* -0.0004 -0.0014** -0.0018***  -0.0011* -0.0014**  -0.0016*** 
small P I
−   -0.0024*** -0.0012  -0.0019*** -0.0032***  -0.0021***  -0.0022 -0.0037*  -0.0012 -0.0021  -0.0031** 
e arg l S I −   -0.0001 -0.0003  0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0002 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0001  0.0000 
small S I
−   0.0000 -0.0007 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001  0.0002  0.0000 
long P D −   -0.0009 0.0000  -0.0026  -0.0007  -0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0045*  -0.0015  -0.0027  -0.0036* 
long S D −   -0.0020** -0.0015  -0.0019* -0.0022*** -0.0019** -0.0005  -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0005  -0.0003 
i ∆   0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
e arg l P I −   0.0000 0.0000  -0.0408  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
-5.8E-06*** 0.0000 -0.1360  -9.4E-06*** 2.9E-06*** 
-7.6E-06** 
small P I
−   0.0000 0.0000  0.5043*  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
-3.1E-05*** -2.9E-05** -0.0209  -4.4E-05*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
e arg l S I −   0.0000 0.0000  0.0478  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1692  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
small S I
−   0.0000 0.0000  0.0425  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 5.2E-06*** 0.59509***  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
long P D −   0.0000 0.0000  -0.1550  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
-4.5E-05*** -3.9E-05*** -1.0084 -6.5E-05*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
long S D −   -7.1E-06** 0.0000  -0.4238  -5.8E-06** 0.0000 
0.0000 
-1.1E-05*** -1.0E-05*** -1.4034*** -9.7E-06** 0.0000 
0.0000 
i ∆   -2.9E-07*** 0.0000  -0.0301  -1.8E-07*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0431  2.3E-07*** 0.0000 
0.0000 
Notes:  as for Table 3a 
 
Table 6c. Estimation Results, 1999 to 2002 
 
t I   2 − t I  
 GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH GARCH  GARCH-
in-Mean 
EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH
MEAN EQUATION 
e arg l S I −  0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0004  0.0009*** 0.0007*  0.0006** 
small S I
−   0.0022** 0.0022** 0.0019* 0.0023**  0.0014  0.0017** 0.0009  0.0006 0.0020*  0.0017*** 
long S D −   -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0004 0.0006  -0.0010 0.0001 
i ∆   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0001 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
e arg l S I −  0.0000 1.1E-05* 0.1811***  9.4E-06* 0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1582*** 0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
small S I
−   0.0000 0.0000 0.2203 0.0000 0.0000 
2.4E-05* 
-3.3E-06** 0.0000  -0.1238  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
long S D −   0.0000 0.0000 -0.0170  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
3.8E-06* 0.0000  0.2222  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
i ∆   -7.0E-07*** -6.9E-07** -0.0695*** -6.6E-07*** -3.5E-07*** 
0.0000 
-1.1E-06*** 0.0000 -0.1085*** 0.0000  -8.9E-07*** 
0.0000 
Notes: As for Table 3a 
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Table 7. Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests, 1997-2002 
  1 2  3 4 5  10  15  20  30 
SALES 
 GARCH=> inter  0.662  0.469  0.571  0.324  0.176  0.131  0.1  0.262  0.185 
 inter=> GARCH  0.046  4.814***  3.475***  2.861** 2.335**  1.16  0.777 0.597  0.419 
  GARCHM=>  inter  0.727 0.43  0.746  0.532 0.251  0.193  0.179 0.25 0.195 
 inter=> GARCHM  0.019  9.874***  6.785***  5.091*** 4.04***  1.97*  1.32*  1.011  0.711 
  EGARCH=>  inter  0.055 0.094  0.065  0.141 0.149  0.078  0.058 0.058  0.057 
  inter=>  EGARCH  0.013 1.332  1.327  1.297 1.36  0.842  0.572 0.428  0.293 
  TGARCH=>  inter  0.785 0.586  0.677  0.387 0.229  0.166  0.128 0.386  0.269 
 inter=> TGARCH  0.099  3.945*** 3.032*** 2.736** 2.281** 1.146 0.767  0.593 0.425 
  CGARCH=>  inter  0.142 0.285  0.226  0.338 0.23  0.141  0.097 0.266  0.189 
  inter=>  CGARCH  0.390 0.516  0.437  0.442 0.377  0.264  0.189 0.148  0.132 
PURCHASES 
 GARCH=> inter  2.015  1.343  0.081  0.083 0.074  0.129  2.667*** 2.118*  4.347*** 
 inter=> GARCH  0.005  8.01***  6.274***  4.756*** 3.796***  1.907*  1.303* 0.977 0.841 
 GARCHM=> inter  4.671***  2.525** 0.162  0.152  0.124  0.13 2.286***  1.81 3.926*** 
 inter=> GARCHM  0.525  14.498*** 10.624*** 8.166*** 6.573***  3.37*** 2.262*** 1.687  1.536 
 EGARCH=> inter  0.067  0.04 0.045  0.065  0.065 0.269  2.241***  2.588** 4.989*** 
 inter=> EGARCH  0.14  0.325  0.229  0.188  0.138  0.08  0.05  0.031  0.062 
 TGARCH=> inter  1.49  1.184  0.098  0.115 0.12  0.193  2.657*** 2.133*  4.158*** 
 inter=> TGARCH  0.042  6.681*** 5.606*** 4.251***  3.393*** 1.709  1.176  0.883 0.738 
 CGARCH=> inter  0.349  0.196 0.131 0.089  0.132 0.111  2.702***  2.104* 4.234*** 
  inter=>  CGARCH  0.045 0.109  0.91  0.694 0.561  0.31 0.22  0.159  0.238 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analysed the impact of foreign exchange interventions in the Czech Republic from 
1997 to 2002. The event study approach showed that foreign exchange interventions of the 
Czech National Bank were not particularly effective in the aftermath of the currency crisis from 
1997 to mid-1998. Importantly, koruna purchases are almost always very ineffective, whereas 
koruna sales seem to follow exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind in the very 
short run. However, from mid-1998 to 2002, interventions, exclusively koruna sales, turn out to 
be very powerful in reversing and smoothing the appreciation trend of the koruna up to 60 days. 
As far as interventions and forex volatility are concerned, although there appears to be no clear 
pattern in the short term, it seems that on average, interventions tend to generate more exchange 
rate volatility from 30 up to 60 days after the interventions took place. Looking at the individual 
intervention episodes shows that there are episodes for which exchange rate volatility increases 
or decreases depending largely upon the size of the pre- and post-event window. None the less, 
for a number of episodes especially in 1998 and 1999, interventions systematically cause 
exchange rate volatility to increase, while in 2001 and 2002, they tend to dampen forex volatility. 
The GARCH estimation results broadly confirm these findings. Koruna sales appear to have no 
impact on the exchange rate from 1997 to 1998, whereas koruna purchases are usually associated 
not with an appreciation but rather with a depreciation of the exchange rate. Hence, foreign   19
exchange interventions could not help to stop the depreciation of the currency. By contrast, 
koruna sales are found to have a strong positive relationship with the exchange rate from mid-
1998 to 2002. This gives strong empirical support for the view that the Czech National Bank was 
successful in counteracting the strong appreciation pressure on the domestic currency. 
Concerning interventions and forex volatility, the empirical evidence is not particularly strong. It 
is still fair to say that interventions tend to be related with more rather than less exchange rate 
volatility. For koruna purchases, higher volatility seems to ignite interventions, which in turn 
leads to higher volatility. This suggest that the CNB tried to calm the markets after the currency 
crisis, but actually failed to do so. For koruna sales, intervention activity simply yields more 
exchange rate volatility on the forex markets. Hence, by targeting the exchange rate of the 
koruna, the CNB generated extra noise on the markets. 
It has been argued in the literature that developing and transition economies may be in a better 
position than industrialised countries to influence both the level and the volatility of the 
exchange rate via foreign exchange interventions. Overall, our results suggest that although 
monetary authorities may find it cumbersome, especially in times and after of market turmoil, to 
alter systematically the level of the exchange rate in an economy with fully liberalised capital 
accounts and relatively deep financial markets, acting with finesse may reap its benefits. It is, 
however, an open question, whether official interventions were fully sterilised in the Czech 
Republic. If not, this may partly explain the ability of the CNB to intervene successfully.   20
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